Foreign banks' lending to firms in emerging market economies (EMEs) is large and denominated predominantly in U.S. dollars. This creates a direct connection between U.S. monetary policy and EME credit cycles. We estimate that over a typical U.S. monetary easing cycle, EME borrowers experience a 32-percentage-point greater increase in the volume of loans issued by foreign banks than do borrowers from developed markets, with a similarly large effect upon reversal of the U.S. monetary policy stance. This result is robust across different geographic regions and industries, and holds for U.S. and non-U.S. lenders, including those with little direct exposure to the U.S. economy. Local EME lenders do not offset the foreign bank capital flows; thus, U.S. monetary policy affects credit conditions for EME firms. We show that the spillover is stronger in higher-yielding and more financially open markets, and for firms with a higher reliance on foreign bank credit.
federal funds rate) is associated with a strong flow of dollar capital into EME credit markets.
This effect holds throughout the sample period, but is particularly relevant during the zero-lowerbound (ZLB) period when the Federal Reserve kept the federal funds rate at zero and eased monetary policy through unconventional measures that directly impacted long-term rates.
Because of the ZLB constraint on the federal funds rate, we also show that unconventional U.S. monetary policy easing during the ZLB period, as measured by the Wu-Xia (2016) shadow rate, strongly pushes dollar capital into the EMEs. Consistent with the special role of U.S. monetary policy, we find that changes in Eurozone interest rates have an effect on euro-denominated credit, but do not have a significant effect on dollar-denominated credit, to EME borrowers.
Monetary policy is intrinsically connected to economic fundamentals (Romer and Romer 2004) . To show that the identified relationship between U.S. monetary policy and dollardenominated credit flows to EMEs is unlikely to be driven by relative or absolute changes in investment opportunities, but is instead due to monetary policy, we proceed in several steps.
First, we restrict our sample to dollar loans originated by non-U.S. banks to non-U.S. borrowers and show that the core result holds for lending by global banks with marginal direct exposure to U.S. borrowers. The idea is that these banks are serving the borrowers whose investment opportunities are not directly affected by changes in U.S. economic conditions. Moreover, because we focus on loans to borrowers outside of the United States, the inclusion of quarter fixed effects in the analysis allows us to control for foreign loan demand that is correlated with U.S. economic conditions; however, it does not account for differential loan demand by EMEs.
To rule out potentially different correlations between EME credit demand and U.S. economic conditions, we show that the results hold for loans to EME borrowers from (i) both non-tradable and tradable industries, (ii) sectors that produce goods and services with a low country-level export share, (iii) economies with low international trade overall, and, (iv) economies with weak trade ties to the United States. We verify that the effect holds for all geographic regions.
We further show that global bank flows driven by U.S. monetary policy affect EME credit conditions at the firm level. In particular, we confirm that the contraction of credit by banks from developed market economies (DMEs) during a U.S. tightening cycle is not offset by an increase in credit by local banks, but leads to an overall credit contraction and an increase in interest rate spreads for EME borrowers. During a typical U.S. monetary policy cycle where the federal funds rate is increased by 4 percentage points, EME borrowers would experience a 14-percentage-point stronger contraction in credit volume and a 38-basis-point stronger increase in interest rate spreads than would a similar DME borrower. To highlight the macroeconomic risks of foreign credit outflows from EMEs, we also highlight the relatively short maturity of corporate loans and the large amount of loans coming due in any given year. Related to this, we also find that U.S. monetary policy tightening leads to a lower probability of refinancing maturing loans for emerging market borrowers with a high reliance on foreign banks. Finally, we show that EME infrastructure financing by foreign banks is also sensitive to U.S. monetary policy; these investments are heavily dependent on international capital and, specifically, on syndicated bank credit.
At a high level, our paper contributes to the large economic literature on international spillovers via capital flows, monetary policy transmission, and the role of global financial intermediaries. Most directly, our work expands empirical evidence of a "global financial cycle" that is linked to economic conditions in the center country of the world economy (Rey 2013 ). In particular, using a VAR approach, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015) show the importance to global asset prices of the cross-border transmission of U.S. monetary policy via financial intermediaries. In addition, McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko (2015) use aggregate data to study the effect of U.S. monetary policy on global dollar credit. Related to the special role of U.S. monetary policy, Takáts and Temesvary (2016) , using aggregate BIS data, study the role of currency denomination in the transmission of international monetary policy.
We provide firm-level evidence of the transmission of U.S. monetary policy through the balance sheet of global banks. Other papers that use micro data to study EME credit cycles include recent work by Baskaya et al. (2017) , who look at the provision of credit in the Turkish market and connect it to changes in global risk appetite, as measured by the VIX. Demirgüç-Kunt, Horväth, and Huizinga (2017) focus on the role of global banks' charters in foreign markets for the transmission of foreign monetary policy. Morais, Peydró, and Ruiz (2015) and Altunok et al. (2016) examine spillovers of monetary policy through global bank activities in Mexico and Turkey, respectively. In contrast with these papers, our analysis allows us to examine the question in a cross-country setting, covering more than 25 years of global loan issuance. Our emphasis is on the distinct importance of foreign bank lending and, specifically, U.S. dollar lending, in the emerging markets, which is central to the transmission of U.S. monetary policy to EMEs. Bräuning and Ivashina (2017) discuss firm-level evidence on monetary policy spillovers in major developed economies, but the emphasis there is on the interaction with the currency market, with part of the mechanism being specific to capital flows across major currency areas.
Given our focus on the differential sensitivity of emerging market economies to the transmission of U.S. monetary policy, this paper expands work by Forbes and Warnock (2012) , Fratzscher (2012) , and Ahmed and Zlate (2014) that has highlighted the importance of U.S. economic conditions, in particular U.S. monetary policy, for capital flows into emerging markets from a bond and equity flow perspective. More broadly, our work contributes to the literature on credit cycles in emerging market economies and the implications for financial stability and economic development. For example, Acharya et al. (2015) and Shin (2016) highlight the risks to financial stability when emerging market borrowers sharply increase dollar leverage during periods of strong capital inflows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present stylized facts on cross-border lending to EMEs. In Section III, we establish our main result on the effect of U.S. monetary policy on cross-border lending to EMEs. In Section IV, we discuss the consequences of foreign bank funding dependence by EMEs. Section V concludes.
II. U.S. DOLLAR CROSS-BORDER LENDING TO EMES
Foreign bank lending represents a significant fraction of foreign capital inflows to EMEs. As mentioned in the introduction, according to data from the IMF International Investment Position, loans represent about 50 percent of all EMEs' external liabilities.
2 By comparison, Figure II ( Figure III , where we plot the share of loans provided by foreign banks using the DealScan syndicated loan issuance data, the core data for our study. Table I presents the sample composition by country. The figure highlights the strong and persistent reliance of EME firms on foreign bank credit. Throughout the period from 1995:Q1 through 2016:Q3, more than 80 percent of all loan commitments to EME firms were provided by foreign banks, while the share was below 50 percent for developed economies.
[FIGURES II & III]
The importance of global bank flows to EMEs points to the potential exposure of these markets to foreign monetary policy. Moreover, because of the dollar dominance of bank capital flows to EMEs, it is U.S. monetary policy that is likely to be most relevant due to its strong effect on nominal U.S. interest rates. The last three columns in Table I show the country-level currency composition of cross-border credit, making it clear that the dominance of dollardenominated credit is a global phenomenon: from 1990:Q1 through 2016:Q3, the share of dollardenominated cross-border loans issued to emerging market borrowers is about 87 percent for Africa, 95 percent for the Americas, 81 percent for Asia, and 71 percent for Europe (a smaller dollar share goes hand-in-hand with a higher euro share). region, the dollar dominance of cross-border credit holds broadly across borrowers from all industries (based on the 1-digit SIC code) and is not confined to the tradable sectors.
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As Figure IV , we highlight that dependence on dollardenominated credit is a persistent phenomenon that goes back at least two decades.
[TABLE I-II & FIGURE IV]
The evidence presented here substantially expands the evidence presented in earlier work.
For example, 69 of the EME countries covered in our sample are not covered in Gopinath (2016) . Note that a large part of the samples covered by Goldberg and Tille (2008) and Gopinath (2016) are developed economies. In this study, DMEs are included in the analysis in the next section, but we discuss only the reliance on dollar-denominated credit for emerging markets due to the focus of our study. Discussion of heavy reliance on dollar credit in developed markets can be found in Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015) and ECB (2016).
III. U.S. MONETARY POLICY AND CROSS-BORDER LENDING

III.1 Benchmark Results
Building on the economic significance of both cross-border bank lending and dollardenominated lending, we now focus on establishing across-market spillover of U.S. monetary policy. The dependent variable in Tables III through V is the logarithm of the total amount of cross-border dollar lending, ( ), by a bank to a firm in a quarter . Banks are consolidated at the bank-parent level, so a loan made by a subsidiary of a U.S. bank based in
Mexico to a Mexican firm is counted as a U.S. "cross-border" loan to Mexico. DealScan loan issuance data are collapsed to the quarterly format. About 2 percent of all borrowers have more than one loan from a given bank in a given quarter; in such a case, we aggregate the amounts.
Throughout the analysis, we consider only lenders with relatively large commitments on a given loan. 6 The loan amount for a given bank is computed on a pro-rata basis; for example, in a $150 million loan with three large commitments by banks, for each bank would be $50 million. In our baseline analysis, our key independent variable is the effective federal funds rate, which measures the stance of U.S. monetary policy. while EME firms experience an increase of about 4.9 percent, a highly significant differential effect of more than 2.6 percentage points (the t-statistic is 6.43).
Because we know the borrower's identity and its key lenders, in specification (3) we control for bank and firm fixed effects. This helps us deal with a demand-driven explanation of changes in credit behavior by accounting for time-invariant demand factors, such as firms' size group, location, and industry. Moreover, we include quarterly time fixed effects to net out any common time variation, for example, related to global credit demand factors driven by the global business cycle, overall changes in cross-border loan volumes or changes in the value of the dollar over time. Hence, in this specification, we focus on the differential effect of U.S. monetary policy on cross-border loan volumes to EMEs and find that EME loan volumes react significantly more strongly to U.S. monetary policy changes than do DME loan volumes. In specification (4), we include bank-quarter fixed effects in addition to borrower fixed effects; this allows us to control for time-varying bank heterogeneity, such as individual bank health or changes in business models. The identification in this case is driven by the differential loan volumes to emerging and developed countries of a given bank in the same quarter after netting out any borrower-specific, time-invariant characteristics. The result is very robust. In economic terms, the coefficient in column (4) implies that a 25-basis-point easing in the U.S. federal funds rate increases the volume of cross-border loans to borrowers from emerging markets by an additional 2 percentage points, compared with borrowers from developed markets.
In Appendix Table A .I., we take a closer look at the geographic breakdown of emerging market countries and find that our baseline effect of column (4) holds across all regions. The result is economically and statistically weaker only for Latin America (the point estimate is about two-thirds of the estimated average effect). This is in line with Takáts (2010) , who points out that, unlike in other EMEs, the expansion of international banks in Latin America mainly took the form of increased domestic currency lending by local affiliates, making cross-border bank lending relatively less important for these regions. In Appendix Table A .II., we also replicate our baseline result for borrowers from different industries and show that the significantly stronger effect of U.S. monetary policy on EME lending holds for both borrowers from the non-tradable and the tradable sectors, and, hence, is unlikely to be driven by correlated credit demand from EME firms in the tradable sectors.
Our baseline result in column (4) is based on using the federal funds rate as a measure of the stance of U.S. monetary policy. Indeed, the federal funds rate has been the primary tool of U.S.
monetary policy for most periods in our sample. Moreover, this policy rate anchors the short end of the yield curve, thereby having a strong impact on the dollar funding cost of global banks, which is a key determinant of banks' dollar lending decisions. In column (5), in addition to the policy rate, we also include the term spread-the difference between the 10-year U. increased EME lending volumes significantly more than cross-border loan volumes to developed markets. Indeed, the coefficient estimate is roughly similar to the estimate of the federal funds rate reported in column (4). (Results in column (4) are similar if we replace the federal funds rate with the shadow rate during the ZLB period.)
[TABLE III]
The results in Table III , Panel A, show a strong connection between U.S. monetary policy and cross-border dollar lending to EME firms. The Fed's monetary policy actions, however, are endogenous to changes in economic conditions in the United States (Romer and Romer 2004) .
For example, the Fed would typically ease monetary policy when U.S. economic conditions worsen, a period when loan demand in the U.S. could be declining. This could lead to a concern that our earlier results are driven by changes in global banks' relative investment opportunities (the demand channel) and not by the effect that monetary policy has on cross-border dollar credit. We start to address this concern by restricting our sample to loans originated by non-U.S.
banks to non-U.S. borrowers. Importantly, we consider only loans by non-U.S. banks with a low exposure to the U.S. economy. The idea is that banks with low exposure to the U.S. economy are serving the borrowers whose investment opportunities are not directly affected by changes in U.S. economic conditions.
We measure a bank's exposure to the U.S. economy by the share of cross-border loans to U.S. borrowers relative to all cross-border loans over our sample period. Results are robust to measuring banks' U.S. exposure based on a rolling window instead. About 25 percent of banks in our sample have no lending to U.S. borrowers; but these banks account for only 1 percent of all loans. Instead, we define low-U.S.-exposure banks as banks with less than 5 percent (and, as a robustness check, 10 percent) of loans to U.S. borrowers. These low-U.S.-exposure banks account for roughly 10 percent of all loans (25 percent for the 10-percent-exposure cutoff). The results, reported in Table III , Panel B, are comparable to those shown in Panel A, column (5).
The first two columns of Panel B show that, for non-U.S. banks with low direct exposure to the U.S. economy, the significantly stronger increase of EME loan volumes continues to hold. In column (2)-loans by non-U.S. banks with less than 5 percent of their loans to U.S.
borrowers,-we find a significant, albeit quantitatively and statistically weaker (t-statistic of 1.79), differential effect for EMEs.
A decline in economic activity in the United States (correlated with an easing monetary policy) is likely to negatively affect U.S. suppliers and EME exporters more broadly. This suggests a positive correlation between U.S. economic conditions and EME loan demand, which should bias our estimates downward. In columns (3) to (6), we therefore look at loans originated by non-U.S. banks with a low U.S. exposure to EME firms that are unlikely to be affected by changes in investment opportunities in the U.S. economy. Specifically, in column (3), we look at loans to EME firms from the non-tradable sectors based on the 1-digit SIC classification as reported in DealScan. In column (4), we identify, for each EME country separately, borrowers that produce goods and services that have a low export share relative to all exports of each country (goods and services with an export share smaller than the 25 th percentile of the withincountry distribution). In column (5), we look at loans to EME firms from countries with low trade (trade relative to the country's GDP smaller than the 25 th percentile of the cross-country distribution), and in column (6), we look at loans to EME firms from countries with low trade with the United States (U.S. trade relative to the country's total trade smaller than the 25 th percentile of the cross-country distribution). Country-level data on trade statistics are presented in Table I . The results show that once we focus on loans by non-U.S. banks with low U.S.
exposure to borrowers that are unlikely to have a strong link to U.S. economic conditions (and hence their time-varying loan demand is orthogonal to U.S. economic conditions), we see that the differential effect of U.S. monetary policy on EME loan volumes indeed becomes larger and statistically more significant. For example, when we focus on loans to EME firms from countries that have weak trade linkages with the United States, the coefficients on the federal funds rate are over twice the size of the estimates based on the full sample of loans (column 6 in Panel A).
Economically, these borrowers experience a sizable 8.7-percentage-point stronger loan volume increase when the federal funds rate decreases by 25 basis points compared with a similar DME firm.
So far, we used a coarse measure to identify EME borrowers, based on the BIS classification.
In Table IV , we look instead at the underlying country characteristics (compiled from World Bank information) and examine how these characteristics interact with U.S. monetary policy. In column (1), we find that borrowers from countries with higher GDP growth receive larger loan volumes. This result controls for borrower fixed effects; the coefficient is therefore identified from variation in the interest rate spread of a given country. The level effect indicates that a 1-percentage-point increase in the borrower country's GDP growth is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in cross-border loan volumes. Moreover, as the negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates, borrowers in these countries are also more sensitive to capital in/out-flows when U.S. monetary policy eases/tightens. Similarly, high-GDP-growth countries are more sensitive to global bank flows when the U.S. term spread changes (column 2). The estimate on the interaction term indicates that sensitivity to the U.S. federal funds rate increases by about 0.6 percentage points when the borrower country's GDP growth increases by 1 percentage point. In
columns (3) and (4), we show that the stronger sensitivity of bank flows to U.S. monetary policy holds when we use another measure for a high-yield market-the difference between the borrower country's interest rate and the U.S. federal funds rate. The estimate on the interaction term indicates that the sensitivity to U.S. monetary policy changes increases by about 0.3 percentage points when the interest spread increases by 1 percentage point. Qualitatively similar results hold when we consider higher growth in their national stock market index as a proxy for high-yield markets. (The underlying sample changes, due to data availability.) In column (7), we find that borrowers from high-risk countries (as measured by the lagged rating for long-term sovereign debt collected from Fitch Ratings) receive smaller loan amounts. However, the negative coefficient on the interaction term shows that loan volumes to high-risk countries increase more strongly than loan volumes to low-risk countries if U.S. interest rates decrease, in terms of both a lower federal funds rate and a lower term spread (column 8). Overall, the evidence is in line with reaching-for-yield behavior, where DME banks increase syndicated loan originations in riskier and high-growth markets when U.S. interest rates are low (for example, Bruno and Shin 2015) .
[ (5), we look at the euro-denominated cross-border lending of U.S. banks to non-euro borrowers and confirm that for this currency the euro interest rate does matter.
[ Table III, when we look more closely to see in which countries banks invest when U.S. monetary policy easing occurs, we see that the effect is largely driven by investments in emerging markets (column 2). In column (3), we add time fixed effects, banking-sector country fixed effects, and borrower-country fixed effects, thereby mimicking our set of fixed effects from Table III . The significance of the differential effect in the sensitivity to U.S. monetary policy between claims to emerging and developed market countries is robust to the inclusion of these controls. In economic terms, specification (3) shows that emerging market claims increase by an additional 2.5 percentage points compared with developed market claims when the U.S. eases monetary policy by 25 basis points. In column (4), we add banking-sector-quarter fixed effects to the specification, which allows us to control for any time-varying heterogeneity at the bankingsector level. For example, this would accommodate a general contraction in credit abroad of all Japanese banks due to problems in the Japanese banking sector like the shock examined by Rosengren (1997, 2000) . Inclusion of these tighter controls slightly decreases the size of the estimates, but the relationship between monetary policy and bank activity in the emerging markets remains strong. Inclusion of the term spread renders similar results to those of the loanlevel analysis (column 5).
[TABLE VI]
In columns (6) and (7), we look at cross-border interbank claims from banks in developed markets on banks in EMEs. In some countries (for example, Turkey) global banks' capital flows are intermediated by the domestic banking sector. In such settings, the negative impact of capital outflows might be amplified due to increased leverage of the domestic banking sector. From the results in Table VI , we see that interbank claims on banks in emerging markets (relative to crossborder claims on banks from developed markets) increase strongly when U.S. monetary policy eases. Indeed, the point estimates suggest that the effects are more than twice as large as the estimates for claims on nonbank firms. We also verify that this result holds across different EME regions (unreported). However, BIS data indicate that cross-border interbank claims are smaller, with claims on EME banks being about a third of the value of claims on EME (non-bank) firms on average.
Rajan (2014) points out that " [c] ountries that undertake textbook policies of financial sector liberalization are not immune to the inflows-indeed, their deeper markets may draw more flows in, and these liquid markets may be where selling takes place when conditions in advanced economies turn." We examine this proposition in Table VII using the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2006) , which measures the degree of a country's capital account openness based on various restrictions on cross-border financial transactions. The index ranges from 0 (no financial openness) to 1 (full financial openness) and is available at a quarterly frequency through the end of 2014. Unfortunately, there is limited time variation of this measure for a given country. Given that the analysis is effectively cross-country, we report results using the BIS dataset, which has broader coverage of EME countries at the quarterly frequency than DealScan.
Column (1) of Table VII shows that-as one would expect-foreign banks hold more claims on private nonbank entities from EME countries that are more financially open. Note that the regression includes banking-sector country and host-country fixed effects; therefore, the coefficient is identified from changes in financial openness of a given country over time. In Figure V shows that such substitution is unlikely, given a slightly positive correlation between cross-border and local lending in EMEs.
In Table VIII , the dependent variable is the logarithm of the total amount of dollar lending to a firm in a given quarter (that is, ( )) by (a) all foreign banks (columns 1 and 2), (b) all domestic banks (column 3), and (c) all banks (columns 4 through 6).
In columns (1) through (4), we focus on firms with both foreign and local creditors in a given quarter. In columns (1) and (2), the estimates show that the change in the cross-border credit volume in response to U.S. monetary policy is stronger for firms from emerging markets than for firms from developed market economies. The coefficient estimate in column (2) indicates that in response to a decline in the U.S. federal funds rate of 25 basis points, cross-border lending volumes to EME firms increase by 1.9 percentage points more than the respective cross-border volumes to comparable DME firms. In columns (5) through (8), we broaden our sample and consider any firm that obtained cross-border funding in a given quarter, that is, firms that are exposed to global bank capital flows. In columns (5) and (6), we also see that in the broader sample EME firms experience significantly stronger loan volume changes in response to U.S. monetary policy than do DME firms. In column (6), the estimated coefficient indicates a reduction of about 1 percentage point per 25-basis-point increase in the federal funds rate. Column (6) also shows the coefficient on the U.S. term spread, which is directionally consistent with our earlier findings, but not significant at a conventional level. In columns (7) and (8), we estimate the effect of U.S. monetary policy changes on the interest rate spread paid by firms on their dollar borrowing, which we compute as the average all-in-drawn spread to the 3M LIBOR rate based on all loans taken out by the borrower in a given quarter. (The sample changes from column (6) to (7) because the interest rate data are not available for all loans.) The positive point estimate indicates not only that EME firms face higher sensitivity of volumes than DME firms, but also that the price of credit is more sensitive to changes in U.S. interest rates for EME firms than for DME firms. This holds for both the federal funds rate and the term spread. For example, in column (8), we estimate that a 25-basis-point increase in the federal funds rate increases the interest rate spread by 2.4 basis points more for EME firms than for comparable DME firms. We estimate a quantitatively similar effect for an increase in the term spread.
[FIGURE V & TABLE VIII]
Intuitively, EME firms that are more dependent on foreign bank credit may be more affected than other EME firms by fluctuations in cross-border capital flows triggered by U.S. monetary policy changes. To test this intuition, we restrict our sample to EME firms and compute for each firm its dependence on foreign bank credit. More precisely, for each firm-quarter, we compute the number of foreign banks that lent to the firm (relative to the total number of banks that lent to that firm) in the last quarter when the firm was obtaining a loan. The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction term between this foreign bank-reliance measure and the U.S. federal funds rate. The results are reported in Table IX .
In columns (1) through (4), we focus on the logarithm of the total volume of dollar borrowing by an EME firm in a given quarter. Column (1) shows that-consistent with our previous results-the U.S. interest rate is negatively associated with the borrowing amounts.
Moreover, the positive coefficient on the foreign bank-reliance variable indicates that banks with more reliance on foreign banks borrow larger amounts. Our focus is on the interaction term between the U.S. interest rate and the foreign bank-reliance variable. In column (3), once we control for borrower and quarter fixed effects, thus focusing on the cross-section of borrowers, we find a negative coefficient estimate, indicating that firms with a higher reliance on foreign-bank credit experience a larger decline in lending volumes when U.S. monetary policy tightens than similar firms with a lower reliance on foreign banks. For example, if U.S. interest rates increase by 25 basis points, we estimate that a firm with a one-standard-deviation larger foreign bank reliance share (0.32) experiences an additional reduction in total borrowing of about 28 basis points. This effect becomes somewhat larger once we also include the interaction with the term spread, but the estimate loses significance (t-statistic of -1.19).
In columns (5) and (6), we analyze the interest rate spreads of EME firms, depending on their past foreign bank reliance. In column (6), the point estimates indicate that in general EME firms with higher foreign bank reliance pay smaller interest rate spreads (a one-standard-deviation larger foreign bank share reliance is associated with a 25-basis-point lower spread). However, they also experience a larger sensitivity of spreads with respect to both changes in the federal funds rate and the U.S. term spread. For example, if the federal funds rate increases by 25 basis points, we estimate that a firm with a one-standard-deviation larger foreign bank reliance would face a 1.2-basis-point larger increase in spreads (14.43*0.32*0.25), while a similar increase in the term spread would lead to a 1.9-basis-point larger increase in spreads (25.392*0.32*0.25).
Concerns may arise that the results on credit volumes and spreads take into account only granted loans (intensive margin of credit) and do not capture the extensive margin of credit (new loan issuance). To understand the importance of this point, we should emphasize the relatively short maturity of corporate loans: the median maturity of a corporate loan in our sample is five years (mean of 4.3 years). As of the end of 2016, roughly half of the loans outstanding matured within two years, which points to a substantial macroeconomic risk. To address this issue, in Table IX , columns (7) and (8) we estimate the probability of refinancing maturing loans to EME firms. More precisely, for each firm, we look at those quarters where an existing dollar loan matures. We then construct a dummy variable that equals one when we also observe a new loan to the firm, and zero otherwise. As before, we focus on the variation related to the U.S. monetary policy pass-through by foreign banks, holding constant firm and time characteristics.
In column (7), Table IX , we find that if U.S. monetary policy tightens, EME firms with higher foreign bank reliance face a significantly lower probability of refinancing their maturing loans. A 25-basis-point increase in U.S. interest rates lowers the probability of refinancing by about 2 basis points for each standard deviation (0.32) increase in foreign bank reliance (-0.023*0.25*0.32). This corresponds to a 1 percent reduction when compared with the average probability of refinancing of 16.3 percent in our sample. In column (8), the effects become more than twice as large, once we also include the interaction term between past foreign bank reliance and the U.S. term spread. Moreover, we also find that changes in the term spread transmit differentially to EME firms' probability of refinancing, depending on their past foreign bank reliance.
[TABLE IX]
As a final reflection in this paper, we look at the financing of large infrastructure projects, that is, projects related to the provision of essential services that are relevant for the broader economic development and growth of an economy. The idea is to look at lending to a segment that has an unambiguous impact on the real economy. It is also a segment that is likely to be very sensitive to the availability of foreign bank financing (for example, Ehlers 2014, World Bank 2016). Indeed, the alternative to privately syndicated credit is loans from multinational institutions, which tend to follow a very different and intense compliance process. 9 It is also broadly acknowledged that global infrastructure needs largely exceed infrastructure investments, a gap that is anticipated to increase in the future. 10 So, whereas some skepticism might remain as to how hard it is to find alternative financing for corporate investing or whether this type of credit is beneficial in first place, infrastructure investment is high-impact investment for which it is very difficult to find a substitute for global banks' funding. Infrastructure lending is an important part of our sample: DME banks have increased investment in infrastructure projects in EMEs during the last 25 years, rising to a total volume of $25.8 billion in 2014, which equals 13.5 percent of all new loan volumes committed to EME borrowers. In the Appendix, we show that an easing of U.S. monetary policy increases loan origination of infrastructure projects in EMEs to a significantly greater degree than in developed markets.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The mandates of central banks are typically focused on domestic economic conditions and do not account for potential international spillovers. There are some isolated examples of 9 As an example, failure to close a private syndication due to the unravelling of the 2008 financial crisis led to a roughly two-year delay in raising debt funding from multinationals for a construction project of the Egyptian Refinery Corporation. In this paper, we provide evidence on the dominance of dollar-denominated credit in crossborder lending. Outstanding shares of foreign banks' dollar credit for African, American, and Asian emerging economies are over 90 percent. Even for emerging Europe, this number is 60
percent. This point highlights the special role that U.S. monetary policy plays in the formation of credit cycles in EMEs (and the limited role of the local monetary policy). We also show that the availability of foreign bank credit to EME firms-by far the largest category of foreign capital channeled through financial intermediaries into EMEs-is strongly connected to U.S. monetary policy. This effect disproportionately affects EME borrowers as compared with borrowers in developed markets. We estimate that, during a typical monetary easing cycle over which the Fed cuts its target rate by about 4 percentage points, the increase in loan volumes to emerging market borrowers exceeded the flow into developed markets by 32 percent. On the flip side, a monetary policy tightening would pull out bank flows from emerging markets and lead to a strong contraction of foreign credit in emerging markets. The granularity of the data allows us to control for borrower time-invariant characteristics as well as for bank-quarter level effects in lending.
We show that the effect holds for non-U.S. banks, for banks with very small exposure to the United States in their portfolio, for EME borrowers in the non-tradable industries, for borrowers in countries with limited trade linkages to the United States, and overall-and only for U.S.-denominated credit. 
FIGURE V LENDING TO EMES BY FOREIGN DME BANKS VS. LOCAL BANKS
Note: The figure depicts the changes in the (logarithm of) syndicated loan volumes to EME borrowers by local lenders (horizontal axis) and DME/foreign lenders (vertical axis). Each data point corresponds to the change in lending by local and foreign banks in one quarter. The sample covers the period from 1990:Q1 to 2016:Q3. Source: Authors' calculations based on DealScan data. Note: The table is based on syndicated cross-border loans issued from 1990:Q1 to 2016:Q3. Country groups are based on the BIS classification. Offshore centers are excluded from the sample. We also exclude countries with only non-repeat borrowers and four countries with missing trade data. Currency shares are based on loan counts. Trade is the average value of the sum of imports and exports of goods as a percentage of GDP. U.S. Trade is the average value of traded goods (imports plus exports) with the United States as a percentage of total traded goods. Data on trade and GDP are compiled from the IMF. Wu and Xia (2016) . EME is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located in an emerging market country (as defined by BIS), and zero otherwise. DME is a dummy that equals one if the borrower is located in a developed market country, and zero otherwise. The sample in columns (1) (5), while focusing on non-U.S. lenders and non-U.S. borrowers that are unlikely to be connected to the U.S. economy. Non-U.S. Banks with low U.S. exposure are identified based on the number of loans to U.S. borrowers in the entire sample (relative to all loans). Column (3) contains only EME borrowers from the non-tradable sectors based on the SIC 1-digit classification as reported in DealScan. Column (4) contains only EME borrowers from sectors that produce goods and services with an export share below the 25 th percentile (based on the distribution of export shares of all goods and services for each borrower country). Column (5) contains only loans to EME borrowers from countries with an average total trade-to-GDP share below the 25 th percentile of the cross-country distribution (see Table I ). Column (6) contains only loans to EME borrowers from countries with the average U.S. trade share (relative to total trade) below the 25 th percentile of the cross-country distribution (see Table I ). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the dollar loan amount originated by a given bank to a given firm in a given quarter. GDP Growth, , Interest Rate Spread, Equity Returns, and Country Rating describe the home country of the borrower and correspond to lagged values of GDP growth, the spread between the local EME interest rate and the U.S. federal funds rate, stock-market index growth, and the sovereign debt rating ("AAA"=1, "AA+"=2, etc.). Growth rates are in percentage terms. As before, U.S. Interest Rate is the federal funds rate (in percent), and U.S. Term Spread is the difference between the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and the federal funds rate (in percentage points). Robust tstatistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table III , using data on all forms of bank claims on firms (and not just syndicated credit). This sample also covers a larger set of countries. These data are collected from the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the claim amount held by a developed market banking sector on a given country in a given quarter. U.S. Interest Rate is the federal funds rate (in percent). U.S. Term Spread is the difference between the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and the federal funds rate (in percentage points). EME is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located in an emerging market country (as defined by BIS), and zero otherwise. DME is a dummy that equals one if the borrower is located in a developed market country, and zero otherwise. The sample covers the period from 2005:Q1 through 2016:Q3, which is the period for which the data are publically available. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The estimate of the constant is not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
TABLE II -CURRENCY BREAKDOWN OF CROSS-BORDER BANK LOANS
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.068** (-2.75) EME -- -0.951*** -- -- -- -- -- (13.43) Fixed Effects: Quarter (Dt) -- -- Yes -- -- -- -- Bank (Dj) -- -- Yes -- -- -- -- Borrower (Di) -- --
TABLE V -SPECIALNESS OF U.S. MONETARY POLICY FOR CROSS-BORDER DOLLAR CREDIT
TABLE VI -BIS CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS BY BANKS FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Quarter (Dt) -- -- Yes -- -- -- -- Bank Country (DJ) -- -- Yes -- -- -- -- Borrower Country (DI) -- --
TABLE VIII -TOTAL DOLLAR BORROWING AT THE FIRM LEVEL
Note: In columns (1) to (7), the dependent variable is the logarithm of the volume of total dollar borrowing (in USD billion) at the firm-quarter level. In columns (8) to (10), the dependent variable is the average all-in-drawn spread to the 3M LIBOR rate (in bps) of all dollar loans the borrower received in a given month. U.S. Interest Rate is the federal funds rate (in percent). U.S. Term Spread is the difference between the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and the federal funds rate (in percentage points). EME is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located in an emerging market country (as defined by BIS), and zero otherwise. The sample period covers 1990:Q1 through 2016:Q3. Columns (1) through (4) contain firm-quarters with lending by both foreign and local banks; the remaining columns are based on all firm-quarters with lending by foreign banks. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Note: In columns (1) to (4), the dependent variable is the logarithm of the volume of total dollar borrowing (in USD billion) at the firm-quarter level. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the average all-in-drawn spread to the 3M LIBOR rate (in basis points) of all dollar loans the EME borrower received in a given month. In columns (7) and (8), the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if an EME firm obtains a new loan in the quarter when an earlier loan matures and zero otherwise. Past Foreign Bank Reliance is the share of global banks from developed countries lending to the firm in the last quarter the firm was borrowing. As before, U.S. Interest Rate is the federal funds rate (in percent). U.S. Term Spread is the difference between the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and the federal funds rate (in percentage points). The sample period covers 1990:Q1 through 2016:Q3 and contains only EME firms. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table III , column (4) for borrowers from different regions and industries; that is, each coefficient reported in this table corresponds to the same regression estimated based on different subsamples. The common regression equation is given by Log� � = • . .
• + + + , where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the loan amount originated by bank j to firm i in quarter t.
is a bank*quarter fixed effect, and is a borrower fixed effect. U.S. Interest Rate is the federal funds rate. EME is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located in the corresponding emerging market region (as defined by BIS), and zero otherwise. Offshore centers are excluded from the sample. Industry classification is based on the 1-digit SIC code as reported in DealScan. The sample covers the period from 1990:Q1 through 2016:Q3. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the dollar loan amount originated by a given bank to a given firm in a given quarter. U.S. Interest Rate is the federal funds rate (in percent). EME is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located in an emerging market country (as defined by BIS), and zero otherwise. The sample covers loans by developed countries banks during the period from 1990:Q1 through 2016:Q3. We use different methods to identify infrastructure-related projects, including the maturity of the loan and sector of the borrower. In columns (3) and (4), we restrict the sample to infrastructure-related projects as classified in World Bank (2016). In columns (5)-(7) we look at corporate loans to borrowers from infrastructure-relevant sectors, based on the classifications by the World Bank (2016) and the BIS (Ehlers 2014) . Columns (9) and (10) focus on corporate loans with maturity longer than 5 years, given that infrastructure-related credit is typically of long maturity. Given that the structure of the investment where the assets of the sponsor are ring-fenced and repeated projects by the same sponsor are rare, we do not include borrower fixed effects in Columns (1)-(4). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
